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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
DONALD L. BEE 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 880469-CA 
Brief of Respondent 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(b) 1953, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial judge properly admitted State's 
Exhibit IfC", and whether it was proper to allow the jury to 
consider the results of an intoxilyzer test that was given. 
II. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the 
jury on the time frame in which an intoxilyzer test must be given 
and whether that instruction contained an unconstitutional 
presumption. 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. The case was tried before a jury on 
the 6th day of May, 1988 and the defendant was found guilty. The 
defendant was sentenced on the 25th day of May, 1988 and on the 
3rd day of June, 1988, a motion for new trial was filed by the 
defendant. This motion was denied and on the 29th day of July, 
1988, a Notice of Appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not dispute the facts as set forth in 
Appellant's brief except that the State would put forth that no 
objection was raised as to Instruction No. 8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. That the State's Exhibits "B", "C", and "D" were 
properly accepted into evidence and submitted to the Jury. Each 
of these exhibits met the foundational requirements to be 
admitted and any interpretation of that evidence was a question 
for the Jury. 
2. That Appellant failed to object to Instruction No. 
8 at the trial level, and even if there had been an objection, 
the instruction does not set forth any unconstitutional 
presumptions that would warrant a reversal of the case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BREATH TEST GIVEN TO THE 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
As indicated in Appellant's brief, Appellant was 
charged by information with Driving While Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and/or Drugs. As part of the investigation, Appellant 
was given an intoxilyzer test to determine the alcohol content of 
his blood. 
When an intoxilyzer test is used, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-44.3 sets out the standards which must be followed 
in order for the test to be introduced at trial. In the present 
case, the officer who gave the test to Appellant testified that 
(1) he had been trained and certified in the use of the 
intoxilyzer machine, (2) he followed each and every step in 
administering the test as he has been trained to do, (3) he 
inserted the intoxilyzer test record as required, and (4) it 
printed out the results on that test record (T.79 - 88) 
The issue then became what the results printed on that 
test recorded meant. The State offered exhibit "D" which was the 
intoxilyzer test affidavit. There was no question that the 
machine used to give Appellant the test was the same machine that 
was the subject of the test affidavit. 
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A review of the affidavit shows that the machine used 
to test Appellant gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 
liters of breath. Therefore, when Appellant was tested, the 
machine used to test Appellant was measuring grams of alcohol per 
210 liters in Appellant's breath. Therefore, the exhibits 
introduced by the State fully meet the requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-44.3, and the Court did not error in allowing 
those exhibits into evidence. 
It is a long held tradition that it is the trier of 
fact that determines the credibility or non-credibility of any 
witness or any evidence that is offered. Once the results of the 
intoxilyzer test was introduced to the Jury, it was their right 
and duty to determine what weight, if any, they would give that 
evidence. 
If the information and jury instruction required the 
Jury find that Appellant had a blood alcohol content of greater 
than .08%, and the evidence produced by the State showed that the 
Appellant had a breath alcohol content rather than blood alcohol 
content, it was up to the Jury to decide whether the State has 
met it's burden or not . The Jury is free to accept or reject 
all or any part of the evidence submitted by the State. 
Therefore, so long as the exhibits and evidence 
submitted by the State meets the foundational requirements as set 
out by statutes, they can be submitted to the jury. It is then 
the jury's duty to determine how those exhibits should be 
interpreted. 
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Finally, even if the Court were to find that the 
exhibits were improperly submitted, the State would point out 
that there was more than enough other reliable evidence on which 
the jury could have found the Appellant guilty, 
POINT II 
APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTION 
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL AND THE INSTRUCTION DOES 
NOT SET OUT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION. 
In response to Appellant's second point on appeal, the 
State would point out that no objection was lodged to the 
instruction either at the time it was proposed or at the time it 
was read to the jury. Further, no motion for mistrial was made 
after the instruction was read. 
Contrary to Appellant's statement that he was not given 
an opportunity to object to the instruction, the State would 
point out that during the course of the trial, Appellant moved 
the Court to dismiss two of the original counts. That motion was 
granted (T.167) and after granting that motion the Judge 
indicated that new instructions would be prepared (T.168). 
New instructions were prepared and submitted to both 
the Defense and the Prosecution. The Judge read these 
instruction to the jury. Therefore, Appellant had at least two 
opportunities to object to the instruction: when new instructions 
were made, and when they were read to the Jury. 
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Even accepting arguendo that this issue is properly 
before the Court, the State would argue that the presumption set 
forth in the instruction does not rise to the level of violating 
Appellants due process rights. 
The instruction merely sets forth a presumption that if 
a chemical test was given within two hours of the driving, then 
the blood alcohol level shown by the test is presumed to be the 
same level as at the time of the actual driving. This 
instruction merely sets forth the natural fact that it takes a 
certain amount of time for alcohol levels in the blood to be 
metabolized out. Therefore, after a two hour period, 
very little alcohol will have been metabolized out of the 
suspects system and the test level will not be significantly 
affected. 
Further, there is no presumption of correctness set 
forth in this instruction. The Jury must still decide whether 
the machine was operating correctly, whether the operator 
followed the proper steps in administering the test, and several 
other factors before they can conclude that the defendant is 
guilty. 
If the instruction had stated in effect that had the 
test been given within two hours of the driving, then the jury is 
to presume that either the defendant is guilty or the test is 
accurate and they need not deliberate any further; that then 
would be an unconstitutional presumption. 
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Finally, even if this instruction is found to have been 
given improperly, it is harmless error in that there is more than 
sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the Appellant 
guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not error in allowing Exhibit "C" 
to be admitted into evidence, or to allow Instruction No. 8 to be 
given. Neither of these issues were major and there was more 
than sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?/ day of May 1989. 
Spz&fcnTv. Major /f 
Attorney for Plaiivciff/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
i * "• J flection * i - ^ - * - , : 
rne commissioner wx L;-^  department cf Pub • <: •-* 
Safety shall establish standards for tn.€ 
administration and interpretation of chemical 
analysis of a person'- v^ath . including standards 
of training. 
In any action cr pre- . wni^r, it ; s 
material to prove that a person was operating or 
in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or 
events to prove that the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to 
standards established in Subsectior fis ^re 
admissible if: 
a. the judge finds Lnat they *.«ero. r. •* :_:;*-
regular course of the investigation at cr 
about the time of the " -*" ---.rn^H* :- -v- ^r 
event; and 
b. the source of information rrom wnich uidae 
and the method and circumsti^^^ --? th^j r 
preparation indicate their 
trustworthiness. 
If the judge finds that the standards establ. ---d 
under Subsection fl) and the conditions of 
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a 
presumption that the test results are valid « 
further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
